This letter is presented in an effort to clear up some of the disinformation and answer questions that have arisen out of the recent disclosure to the public of events surrounding the Swissair 111 investigation. Due to space considerations, what is presented here is only a small portion of the details that were presented to the Commissioner, and later to the Fifth Estate.
First of all, at the time of the crash, I was a Forensic Identification Section member on the Halifax Ident Section with twenty-three years of forensic ident service. I had been posted to various locations across this country, beginning with Prince Rupert, then moving to Bathurst, Frobisher Bay, Yellowknife, New Minas, and Halifax with time spent in Yarmouth. Besides being a fully qualified and experienced FIS investigator in the routine areas of ident work, I had gained extensive training and experience in arson investigation, including three level two courses and a level three course, as well as an explosive demolition course with the Canadian DND. I had been accepted as an expert in arson scene investigations in courts in New Brunswick, NWT, and Nova Scotia, and have worked with some of the best arson investigators in this country. In addition, I had been involved with numerous previous aircraft accidents, including a fifteen passenger fatal in Northern BC.
During the sixty days of the morgue, I was responsible for the fingerprint ID of the victims along with logistics and quality control of the various identification processes undertaken in the morgue. All procedures in the morgue had to conform to international standards. As the first on site FIS member in the hangar, I worked closely with Public Works to set up the actual morgue facilities.
On the closing of the morgue, it was determined that there was a need for a major FIS presence in the aircraft reconstruction side of the investigation. RCMP members were having a major problem with Transportation Safety Board investigators failing to conform to proper investigative techniques. Exhibit control was a major concern along with photographic control. Certain TSB members were taking their own low quality digital images contrary to the agreed protocol, without making them available for the file, and without proper photo identification techniques. Complaints had been received from TSB members themselves that they were unable to control their own members regarding the use of proper techniques, especially regarding exhibit control.
Soon after, control of the photo process and exhibits was regained, and an organized system of evidence processing was arranged for those thousands of highly specialized debris pieces that were deemed to be crucial to the interpretation of the events. This is not to say that crash debris had not been processed in a very controlled and organized manner by the RCMP onsite, but once inside the hangar, those exhibits had become available to the TSB and some of their processing and control had become most haphazard.
For several months, exhibits were placed on the now familiar aircraft jig and on other frames only after being processed by means of court acceptable methods. However, in mid-February, 1999, Vic Gerden and Larry Vance, as the members in charge of the TSB investigation, ruled that there was no need for such a rigorous quality of work. The reasons given were that they only conduct a safety investigation and not a criminal investigation. As such, they never attend court under any circumstances, so therefore they do not require that level of work. Their practice is to negotiate any disagreements within the industry, and not to use a hammer to obtain results. Close enough became good enough, at least until other closer-enough pieces came along. Since finances were tight, RCMP management readily agreed, and I concentrated on other photo tasks. Meanwhile as the jig was filling, the pieces were showing an extensive amount of burning, even of metal structures. Large amounts of molten aluminum were being discovered, and engineers from Boeing and Swissair were asking why. There was ample evidence of extremely high heat, even though the aluminum skin and frame of the aircraft had acted as a heat sink at a temperature of minus 60 degrees F. TSB members themselves were raising questions and making comments. Everything indicated an extremely high burn area with molten and deformed metal in especially one particular location, that being above ceiling at the right forward door. But because it was a lift type door, there was limited flammable material in that particular overhead area.
During late 1999 and early 2000, I made three trips to Zurich to examine fifteen Swissair MD-11 aircraft. Three aircraft were under a 'D'-check, which is a complete overhaul of the aircraft including the stripping out of the interior. For the third trip, I was tasked to attend alone to retrieve specific aircraft parts from the plane being serviced, along with specialized photographs of specific parts and aircraft interior locations. The TSB member with whom I worked closely told me that I knew the aircraft better than most of his own TSB members. As well I knew and was known and trusted by the Swissair personnel within the Zurich hangar.
During my first trip, my accompanying TSB member provided a list of things that should be watched for as the investigation unfolded. The observation of such artifacts could well indicate that the fire had been caused by a criminal device. Well before the winding down of the RCMP investigation in June, 2000, every item of concern had been observed. Then during the second trip, the Swiss aircraft tech who was assigned as my hangar assistant inadvertently provided a potential scenario in which such a criminal device could be delivered and secreted on the aircraft in the exact location that showed the most extensive burn.
As part of the investigation, every inch of the 250 km of wire was examined for the evidence of burn or short circuits. On finding the first short circuited wire, the TSB electrical examiner excitedly declared to hangar personnel that he had found the cause of the fire. He was soon cautioned by another TSB investigator that this was likely the first of many such shorts, as is normal in any electrically active structure fire. By the end, there were at least twenty-eight short circuited wires found in the wreckage. It has been promoted that the TSB members are highly trained aircraft investigators. While this may be so as it pertains to aircraft structures, it was most evident that only one, John Garstang, was trained as a forensic physical evidence examiner. The rest had no experience with fire investigations and proper forensic techniques, or with interviews and other investigative skills.
Let me explain just how the burnt wires were placed back in 'their correct' positions within the frame. Strands of multi-twist wires, some six feet but usually much less in length, had been burnt clean of their flammable insulation in an exceptionally hot fire. The TSB had them analyzed by the Chemistry Section of the Halifax Crime Detection Lab for any surface residues. The wires, some still hot from the fire, had been through the instant of the crash, impacted with overlaying debris, grabbed with a grapple bucket, dumped on a barge with other debris, sorted to boxes of debris, washed, placed wet in boxes with other debris, dumped on the common hangar sorting table, placed in a holding box for wires, and handed around the hanger from table to table. This was all without protection from contamination from other wires, dust, debris, dirt, etc. Now the surfaces were to be examined for attached residues. When the member in CDL Chemistry found out these details, he had already performed the analysis and found surface materials. He submitted a report indicating basically that the materials were foreign dirt and debris and unsuitable for comparison purposes. The TSB wire examiner then demanded a copy of the crime lab's analysis material, and undertook his own comparison and evaluation to 'successfully' place the wires in the jig. I was told to ignore it as the TSB did not go to court, and did not need court admissible evidence, and were simply conducting a safety investigation. This highly trained TSB electrical investigator was simply a former commercial electrician with no secondary education and no forensic experience, and limited knowledge of the aircraft.
In another incident, a large frame of all the overhead exhibits including ducts, electrical equipment, and other items had to be photographed three separate times because after each lengthy session, it was found that exhibits had been improperly placed. A duct had been reformed using materials that could not be physically matched together, and it was found to be several feet too long. Next, wires as well as other exhibits were found to be out of place by several feet. In the end, the jig never was photographed with all pieces accurately placed. Keep in mind that every item in an aircraft has a definite x, y, z coordinate. In the end, pieces were placed on the frame, in jigs, or in reconstructed assemblies simply because they looked like they belonged, not because an individual piece was physically matched to its neighbor.
The TSB decided to try to identify which short circuit had initiated the fire. There was no question in their minds of anything other than an accidental cause because they do not investigate any criminal matters, and do not investigate any matter for a potential criminal cause. However, it is most interesting to note that on two separate occasions, the TSB electrical examiner told me that at the first stages of the investigation, he was of the opinion that an incendiary device had been the cause of the fire. Yet nothing had been said, and indeed, the Insp. OIC of the morgue had told me by day 10 that the matter was an accident. By day 3, the members conducting passenger profiling were told by another inspector to stop, and cargo checks were never carried out.
But regarding the wires, it was decided to try a method that had received limited success in the US. There is an old physics principal called Sievert's rule. In the simplest of terms, it states that a liquid absorbs the gases that surround it in direct proportion to its temperature and surrounding pressure. A short circuit is a liquid at an extremely high temperature for only an instant, and the aircraft pressure was set at an altitude equivalent to 5500 feet. Dr. Anderson from California had adapted this rule to create his own theory that the initiating short circuited wire, the wire that creates the fire, will absorb clean air. Any follow-on short circuits will be caused by the ensuing blaze and will occur in a smoke contaminated atmosphere. Molecules of those burnt compounds will be absorbed at the moment of the short circuiting event.
Anderson found that the best method to tap into the bead of the short circuit was Auger Electron Spectroscopy. A description of the method can be found on the internet, but let it be said that when the space shuttle Challenger blew up, AES was instrumental in proving the cause of the disaster. The TSB contracted Dr. James Brown, a PhD in Geology with fifteen years experience in using the equipment at CANMET in Ottawa, a branch of Natural Resources Canada. Over the course of the next two years, a series of examinations took place that included test wires prepared at the Boeing Electrical Lab in Seattle, Washington, and sea water test wires prepared in Halifax.
In September 1999, just one year into the file, the first AES test was undertaken. It resulted in Dr. Brown finding aluminum, iron, and magnesium along with some zinc, and usually with proportionate oxygen in the beads that are normally 99.99% pure copper. He indicated to me three possible scenarios that could have caused these results. The first involved an extremely complicated burn pattern that required several melts of the beads pre-crash. The second involved absorption of elements from the seawater post crash. However, he tended to rule out both of these because some of the wires had only received a single melt, and it would have meant 'selective absorption' of those elements found when it was clear that other elements should also have been absorbed. While seawater contains traces of nearly every element on earth, calcium, sodium, and chlorine are abundantly present, and none of those elements appeared in the beads tested to that point. His third scenario involved an incendiary device that contained those three elements. He described such a device, and later I easily located on the internet the 'anarchist's cookbook' which clearly provided a recipe for such a device. Two years later in Los Angeles I learned from a book store owner that he was unable to keep that book on his shelves due to its demand. Without knowing my identity, he was willing to make arrangements to send me a copy.
Later, in discussions with co-investigators, including a member of the TSB, it was determined that this last scenario could easily account for all of the extensive burn and heat that was applied to the frame materials. Add to that, I had already discovered a potential method of delivery. We also knew that security at the JFK airport was lacking as one of the servicing employees had used false identification to only work the one shift, and that this was not uncommon. The security guard on the aircraft routinely chose to remain in a lavatory when the cleaning and servicing staffs were active.
So, now there was a need to discover a legitimate source for the questioned elements. While AES testing continued to find similar results in some of the remaining beads, attempts were made to conduct testing on items that were normally in the burnt areas of the aircraft. Some of the Seattle wires had been shorted while surrounded with smoke from burning aircraft materials, yet tests of those wires failed to find any of the three questioned elements. It may be noted that some lengths of wire debris showed more than one short circuit within two feet of each other, but AES testing provided Al, Fe, and Mg in one bead but not the other. This again tended to support the latter of the three theories, as one would expect that post crash absorption would occur in all beads. It is also of importance to note that Boeing and Swissair personnel were present for the testing, and it was later confirmed that suitably qualified Boeing personnel were being kept abreast of the results. The Boeing consultant, several years later, advised that their engineers were of the opinion that a criminal device had been on board, and that they were astounded at our non-action in the matter. His comment regarding the final decision of the TSB was that it was mere speculation based on their requirements, but not on firm evidence.
While all of this was going on, the members of the TSB responsible for the wire examination plus the TSB's hangar management decided that they wanted no further AES testing. The reason given to me was that the testing was for the Anderson theory alone, that they had not obtained the results that they wanted, so they would stop the tests. Soon after, they would argue that the Anderson results were valid, but the results providing the three elements, although within the same bead, were invalid due to contamination. Over the next six to eight months, a series of intense meetings were required to make the TSB continue with the testing. TSB management was told in no uncertain terms by me that the AES testing would be taken over by the RCMP and they would then lose control of that part of the file. While they took this threat seriously, they endeavored to drag out the testing process, and even tried to prohibit the seawater tests that were undertaken to show that salt water did not contribute to the placement of the elements. At no time did RCMP file management undertake to meet with TSB management to firmly lay out for them what was required and what we planned to do about it. I was frequently told that the TSB would notify us if there was anything criminal, and that we had to wait for them to advise us in writing. We were in the information collection stage, not in a criminal investigation.
It may be noted that in one portion of the tests that were undertaken to determine if there had been seawater absorption, shorted wires were placed on a piece of pure magnesium aircraft rudder pedal. Rudder pedals were the only pure magnesium parts that are in the cockpit, along with some main door frame items. If there had been a galvanic current that had caused the transfer of elements, it would surely happen again with these wires. When AES tested, they proved to contain no magnesium, nor any other elements normally found in seawater. The results were obvious. The contaminants did not come from seawater, contrary to what is now promulgated by the TSB management.
Besides attempting to block some of the tests, false wires were provided to Dr. Brown by the two TSB members in an effort to upset the findings. On learning of this, I notified Dr. Brown who became most upset at the lack of cooperation that he was receiving. At one point, the TSB metallurgist was adamant that the wire he had supplied was a sufficient test and it would prove his point. But upon checking, it was found to be a clean wire without the three elements, and he quickly changed his tune. However, my main concern was that the TSB would turn the testing over to us. With the funding problems and complete lack of investigative skill and knowledge that I had encountered from my supervisors, I feared there would be no desire to undertake the types of testing that were required to determine if a criminal device actually had been used.
At one point in a group meeting, the TSB's electrical examiner made a statement that Dr. Brown had gone completely away from his contract requirements, and that he would ensure that Brown was 'put back on track'. In a subsequent discussion with my supervisors, it was decided that precautions must be taken in that Dr. Brown should be advised to record any attempts made by any person to influence his work or findings, and that he should immediately report to me any such occurrences. Indeed, Dr. Brown mentioned this in the Fifth Estate program, and his response was an email in which he thanked us for our support. But within days, my own supervisors started a continuous accusation that I had attempted to influence and intimidate Dr. Brown.
Shortly after this, those same two supervisors began to influence my actions in the hangar. This was shortly after a discussion of file events with an inspector who stated that he was attached to the Privy Council in Ottawa. But it is important to note that immediately after returning from the initial AES examination, the Criminal Operations officer, C/Supt. Duncan (soon to become the Deputy Commissioner of the Prairie Region and then suddenly pass away), in a phone call, advised me that we must maintain a criminal investigation and attend at every test to be undertaken, and remain vigilant to the presence of a criminal device. Yet, a month later, a decision was made by Force management that the course of the non-investigation would remain unchanged. It would be 'folly and reckless' to change the course of the investigation, and this evidence was 'merely physical evidence, and not as reliable as an eye-witness account of events.' Needless to say, these statements did not meet the criteria of proper police investigative ethics, and I realized at that point there was a need to act independently. I was asked by my immediate officer if I had any idea what would happen if the public learned that airliners were being randomly attacked by terrorists. Later, similar words would be heard during a meeting to describe the 'parking of the file' by the RCMP. The terms "a loss of Government interest" and "no political interest" in continuing the file, and that the file "has lost its gloss" were statements that came from the soon to be Deputy Commissioner.
Earlier, I had sat in on a TSB meeting in which Vic Gerden made similar comments. He stated that this was not the United States and the TSB does not do investigations the way they do. Only two Canadians had been on board, but about 56 million had been spent on their deaths. The decision had been made that they will have the file wrapped up by the end of September. When asked who had made the decision and how had the date been selected, Gerden said that it had been made at a very high level. Mr. BOUCHARD was very astute at understanding the political winds and that they wanted to get this wrapped up before those winds changed and support for the investigation was removed. They were trying to be prepared for what they believed would occur very shortly as there would soon be a loss of "Political Interest" in the investigation.
So, the crunch was coming, but the TSB had their safety file and their international prestige was safe if precautions were taken.
A back room investigators' report helped to shape the RCMP pull out. Karl Christiansen had arranged to visit with the FBI agents who worked the Pan Am Flight 800 investigation. Instead, they met with the World Trade Center bombing investigators. Karl had desperately wanted me to attend because some of the areas to be discussed included topics of which I alone had firsthand knowledge. An example was the overhead MD-11 aircraft equipment and materials that were involved in the fire. AES and fire load were two others. But Karl was told that I had travelled enough and could not attend, so these topics were discussed by a room full of investigators with inadequate knowledge of the subject matters. When he returned, Karl was thoroughly disgusted with the meeting results. Dust balls, aluminum swarf (metal debris remaining after a hole is drilled in a frame) and resins were given as a sufficient fire load to cause such an intense blaze. Later testing would show that none of the overhead materials had such heat producing abilities. As an example of the heat required, ceiling tile in the suspected area was shown to have been heated to a temperature as high as 1700 deg F. for five minutes. A piece of PBE (personal breathing equipment) was found to be discolored and charred by flame. The company stated that the material will withstand temperatures of 1500 deg F for five minutes without turning colour, and a PBE is not stored or used in the overhead area. Additionally, I was fed false information by my officer i/c that the FBI had run AES examinations on the flight 800 wires, had run into the exact same problems of magnesium, aluminum, and iron, but had dropped the tests by concluding that the elements had come from seawater. When told, I suspected the accuracy of this information as the TSB and Dr. Brown both had told me that this was the first time that either AES or the Anderson theory had ever been used in an aircraft accident investigation. This was later confirmed, even though I was continuously fed information that a report from the FBI was in the mail, and even that a report but not the correct one had already been received.
Karl, while on the trip, had liaised with the Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms investigators in New York and arranged that they attend at the hangar to view the debris. It was to be a training exercise so they could cover their own expenses. When my OIC learned of this, he ordered Karl to cancel the trip, to have no further contact with ATF, and to meet with him over his notes. During the meeting, he was told that he had to alter his notes, and was given a document to sign that was similar to the one that later would be given to me. Karl refused, the document was withdrawn, and he was told to immediately leave the hangar, to cease any part in the investigation, and to have no further contact with me whatsoever. The next day he was gone.
In addition, John Garstang of the TSB had tried to arrange for Dr. Quintiere of the University of Maryland to attend and view the wreckage. He was one of two world recognized experts in aircraft fire examinations. My information was that he was very suspicious of the limited fire load being able to cause that amount of damage. It ended up that he was not allowed to attend the hangar. The TSB could not be seen to entertain an arson investigator when they do not investigate fires for arson. The other aircraft expert was Dr. Lyons of Atlantic City. As the director of the Federal Aviation Administration burn facility, he had an extensive background in aircraft fires, having conducted thousands of experimental burns for more than ten years. In a meeting with him in the fall of 2001 at his FAA office, Dr. Lyons told me and three TSB members that he had never seen molten aluminum in any of their experimental aircraft burns unless an accelerant was included in the fire load to boost the heat production.
By the end of June, 2000, the RCMP had decided to pull all of their members out of the hangar except three. I was to remain to continue photographic and technical exhibit assistance to the TSB, and two constables remained to provide exhibit control and computer control. In his concluding meeting, Chief Superintendent Duncan advised that I was to remain to assist the TSB, but that I was still a policeman, and if anything of interest or significance was found, there was a line of reporting for me through the OIC Major Crime Unit, Halifax, who was my same supervising officer.
However, since the first AES testing, I had been increasingly criticized by both my supervisors both verbally, on written reprimands (Form 1004), and in memos, that I was conducting a criminal investigation when in fact there was insufficient evidence to conduct such an investigation. Equipment that was required in assisting the TSB was removed from my hangar office without any discussion, only to sit in a darkroom of the Halifax FIS for nearly two years without ever being used. Any requests for travel to various tests were usually denied, and only after my persistence were they referred to the TSB. Only after lengthy discussions with both my Force supervisors and TSB hangar management was I sometimes allowed to attend, even though TSB members themselves demanded my attendance. After finally getting on a test flight of an MD-11 in California, I was highly criticized that I had placed my life insurance and the civil liability of the Canadian Government at stake if the plane had crashed.
In a meeting held on Dec 1st, 2001, in front of the two RCMP constables and co-investigators from the TSB, both my RCMP supervisors and TSB office management heavily criticized my actions on the file. Six months earlier it had been agreed by my RCMP supervisors and TSB members that I was to forward elimination samples to Dr. Brown in a continuing effort to find a legitimate source for the questioned AES elements. As well, I had liaised with other co-investigators, in particular one from the FAA. I was heavily criticized for both actions, even though the FAA member had requested an update of the AES results. She had been told by TSB management that there was no longer a magnesium problem, that it had been eliminated to seawater. She learned that this was untrue, the seawater source had been ruled out by Brown, and the search was continuing even though I was running out of potential sources. This had embarrassed the TSB management, placed their safety investigation in jeopardy, and thereby somehow embarrassed the Force. After this meeting with the TSB, my supervisors followed me back to my office and proceeded to reprimand me again in an ever increasing manner for numerous 'infractions'. I was given a written order to turn over a copy of all my notes to the inspector, even though the notes were housed in the hangar office on two Force computers to which they had frequent access. Finally, I got up and walked out of the meeting, only to receive a written reprimand two weeks later for leaving the meeting before it was over. The form 1004 did not mention any of the 'infractions' for which I had been severely reprimanded during the two meetings, but it simply stated that I improperly walked out of the meeting. Later the two constables apologized for having had anything to do with the inspector regarding his preparations for the meeting, and my TSB supervisor apologized for not speaking up, but explained that he could not be seen by his management to be in agreement with my view of the file. All agreed that it had been an ambush, and I now refer to the member as 'Ambush Andy'. It is also interesting to note here that the TSB electrical investigator informed me in the first meeting that they had received the initial report from Dr. Brown, but he could not say what was in it.
Within three months, my notes were read by eleven ident members in Ottawa. The fact that Assistant Commissioner Conlin called them 'trained ident members' meant nothing with regards to how the notes were read. Each member was given just over one hundred pages and they were asked to find specific areas that showed an opinion as to the possible cause of the fire, procedures that might be contrary to policy, and entries that might embarrass the Force or the TSB if made public. On February 20, 2001, I was summoned to a meeting of my four present and previous supervisors, having been previously given a false meeting agenda. I had no idea it would be another ambush. The Superintendent OIC Forensic Ident, HQ, Ottawa was in charge of the meeting, with the Inspector i/c Halifax MCU actually running the meeting. The present and the former temporary OIC Regional FIS supervisors (both of S/Sgt. rank but one soon to be commissioned, the other failing in his attempt) were also present, one to take notes, the other to assist when the two officers stopped talking long enough to breath. At the beginning of the meeting, they were advised that Dr. Brown had just sent me an email complaining of undue and incorrect pressure to alter his report. It came from the TSB and his own supervisor. It may be noted that this supervisor, within two years, would go to work for the TSB when their metallurgist retired. In the email, Brown stated that he was submitting a report that some of the wires had shorted in a cloud of magnesium (it was our short hand for Mg, Fe, and Al). Brown was answering the email of exactly one year previous in which I had asked him to contact me if he encountered problems. By passing this on, I was providing my supervisors with direct evidence of both his written opinion of a criminal cause to the fire, and of interference from partner investigators who had ulterior motives. Nothing was done!
Then the agenda suddenly changed and the ambush was sprung. I was told that I had failed them and that I could no longer be trusted to do the correct thing, that I was to be immediately removed from the file, and that photographic tasks would be handed over to 'A' Div Ottawa Ident for them to complete. I questioned this, since the work had to be performed in Halifax, not Ottawa. I also produced an email from my TSB supervisor in which he asked for my extension for at least another two months (I would end up staying in the hangar for another eleven months with continuing periodic requests for assistance for yet another ten months after that). Reluctantly, the superintendent agreed that I would stay, but that I would have no further knowledge of or contact with the reports or any documents pertaining to the file, not even if I submitted exhibits for lab examination myself. So in effect, I was to work blindly on the file, and I was being obstructed from knowing where or how the investigation was going. This was actually the second time in three months that I had been told this, but this time by yet another more senior officer, and a former good friend of some twenty-five years. The meeting then turned to a large stack of paper more than eighteen inches high that was my printed notes. There must have been at least four hundred colored markers attached to that many pages, and it was explained that each marker indicated an area of the notes that needed to be removed or re-written. Two specific areas were retrieved, but due to their haphazard methods, they could not provide a systematic critic of the marked areas. One further area that was asked about centered on explosive wires and fuses that had been located during the beach search. Even though I provided an accurate explanation, the superintendent argued that I had alluded to a potential cover-up of the matter and that I was incorrect in my assessment. The others present corrected him on his understanding of the matter, and reluctantly agreed with me on that one issue. Notes received later from the note taking S/Sgt. supplement my own multiple pages of notes of this meeting. Both sets indicate that the inspector produced the 'change the notes' document, and both officers demanded that I must sign the document. The Fifth Estate program accurately describes the document and my own actions and reasons for signing. However, what was not mentioned was that I first indicated several times to those in the room that this was an illegal and criminal act. They persisted, so I obliged. I then retained the copy of the signed document as evidence of a criminal act.
During the same meeting, I was given a form 1004 for the atrocious notes, and then an assessment that provided their version of my improper actions regarding the file, my notes, and my activities. It may be noted here even though it could not be shown in the program, the then retired inspector, on being approached to appear on the CBC program, described me as being a good investigator and that I kept extremely good notes.
Within a month of the meeting, I approached a local internal investigation section senior S/Sgt. whom I had known for more than twenty years. He advised me not to change my notes as that would be an illegal act, and that he thought that I would not receive an official order to do so. But if I did, it would be an illegal act, so I could therefore refuse to make any changes.
Several months later, the superintendent advised me that the whole note changing effort had been an attempt to teach me how to take proper notes. Yet I had been involved in crime investigations for more than thirty years, had been commended by many judges, crown counsels, and even defense counsels for my recording of crime scenes. Also remember that Christiansen had been told to remove items from his notes, supposedly because of improper note taking techniques, and then banished from the file when he refused to do so.
During the same conversation, the superintendent informed me that the turnover of Dr. Brown's report had occurred, and that 'HQ' Ident was in the process of examining it to seek a second opinion. The report mentioned the potential of a criminal device and it now fell to my previous S/Sgt. supervisor to find someone to verify the results, the same member who had 1004'd me and provided a generous quantity of correspondence condemning me for my criminal investigation stance. I had already learned of this turnover through various emails that I had received, and I realized that it had taken six months for the TSB to supply Brown's report to the Force, the report that Brown was asked to alter so as to remove any reference of a criminal device. This is the one and same report that the TSB has recently publically stated was never turned over to the RCMP because there was never any indication of a criminal device. Since the airing of the Fifth Estate, I have learned that the report clearly stated that the questioned elements did not come from the aircraft, but possibly from the environment in which the short circuits were formed. Brown could not be conclusive as there was still much work to be performed. I also learned that the Ottawa crime lab was approached to examine the report. These are the same lab members who had earlier in 1999 told me that they could not offer an expert opinion of the AES process because they do not use such equipment, and that they deal with compounds while AES breaks those compounds into the atoms of elements. Dr Brown is a PhD of geology while the RCMP Crime Lab has no such person, not even a metallurgist. At no time was I or Dr. Brown contacted to determine what materials had been tested to try to find a legitimate source for the elements. Part of Brown's examination included high power microscopic viewing of the surfaces, yet continuously, the dissenting non-expert opinion was that he had hit cracks and fissures on the bead's surface. I suspect that, without knowledge of the elimination testing that was done, the crime lab suggested seawater as the source and it was readily accepted. This in their minds nullified Brown's report allowing the TSB today to say there was no evidence of criminal involvement. In addition, it has been learned recently that Vic Gerden approached Dr. Brown and illegally coerced him to change his report.
Several things are again interesting to note. While developing the Fifth Estate program, the producer approached a metallurgist at the University of Toronto to examine the readings as recorded by Dr. Brown's equipment. He conducted a blind examination, only knowing that the wires were from an aircraft and of 99.9% pure copper. Part of his comment on completing the examination was to ask the producer if anything had been done about the high magnesium, iron, and aluminum as it was of concern to him. Swiss TV considered running the program, and the producer, who interviewed me, approached two European Universities, one in France and one in Switzerland. Each maintains a world renowned criminology department. The professors who were approached read the TSB's report and were astounded that it said nothing definitive, and that its findings would never be accepted in any court of law. They also commented that simply because there was a short circuit, such an event should not be accepted as the cause of the fire simply because it had occurred. They also agreed that in any normal aircraft fire without an accelerant, the heat sink of the skin and frame would absorb so much heat that it would be impossible for aluminum to melt. When they examined the AES readings, they commented about a potential incendiary device! Swiss TV dropped the program because its scope centered on problems within the RCMP and TSB along with methods of accident investigation within this country. They did not want to put themselves in a position of criticizing Canada when there was no definitive evidence of there actually having been an incendiary device on board, but merely the suspicion thereof with the lack of a proper investigation. The producer, however, is convinced that he will indeed be able to prove that there was a criminal device onboard, and that they will soon be running an updated program for the public.
From 2001 until 2007, I went through grievance procedures for the assessment and for a later promotion opportunity for which I was deemed to be not promotable. Each phase I won, and for every final submission, the adjudicating officer received a summation of the illegal actions of my supervisors. The only officer in the system to demand an investigation was the offending officer, the OIC Major Crime Unit. Internal Investigation Section, Halifax conducted the investigation by simply requesting a copy of my grievance material. I was never interviewed, and no request for further material or an explanation of the details was ever sought. Because it was the officer's complaint, I did not find out the results until more than five years after the grievance was finally upheld. As a result of the promotion Request for Intervention, the adjudicator ordered a new promotion board. 'HQ' staffing took one complete year to hold the new board with the result that I went from last place to a tie with the incumbent, only to lose due to time in the rank. It could be reasonably argued that the incumbent had actually only won three categories to my four, but the next adjudicator did not agree. Of course, the now notorious Barb George was the OIC 'HQ' Human Resources (Staffing) at the time.
When Commr. Elliot came into office, it was touted that there would be a new approach to matters and members could come forward with their complaints. I did so, and it was soon passed over to the Commissioner's Ethics Advisor, A/Commr. Conlin. Her office took two years less one week to 'investigate' the matter, and claimed that it was within the operational manual for an officer to tell an investigator what to have in his/her notes, and that I should have known better than to put in my notes that which I did. After all, notes belong to the Force, and they shall contain what is required to contribute to the prosecution of a suspect. As described to me in Conlin's memo, there is no room in the notebook to record opinion or other evidence unless it is corroborating evidence. So, it would seem that when an ident member records in his notes that a set of suspect prints do not match the crime scene prints, and that person is then charged based on other evidence, those notes are in contravention of the operational manual on note taking because they are not corroborating and are illegal opinion notes. Only in Canada, eh! Pity!
Within a month of receiving Conlin's report, I submitted a 150 page rebuttal report using entries and explanations from my notes, but it was never acknowledged. Then, a second complaint was sent to the commissioner stating that Conlin was incompetent in her job and had acted in a manner that condoned a criminal act. Correspondence from senior managers indicated that the matter would be fully investigated. But soon, during a phone conversation with a defiant S/Sgt. from 'A' Div., I learned that my rebuttal memo would never be read and he would be concluding the matter immediately. Because it had been a complaint handled by the Ethics Advisor and senior RCMP staff, there was no recourse for me through the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP.
After discussing the matter with an astounded Crown Counsel and then with other legal sources, it was learned that there would be no chance for criminal charges in Nova Scotia due to the present political climate, and I received advice that I needed a national inquiry. After two more unanswered attempts at correspondence with 'HQ' Ottawa to ensure that nothing further would be done in the matter, all the requirements of the RCMP Act and of the Public Service Complaints Disclosure Act had been fully met, likely to excess. I then turned to the CBC and to Mr. Paul Palango. He is well known to most members through his three previous books about the Force, and was instrumental in obtaining the assistance of the Fifth Estate in airing the matter. He has decided to write a fourth book about the Force with this file as his prime subject, and is looking at a further documentary. It may be noted that when Linden Macintyre and Karl Morris (the producer) read through the material and met with me, they had no problem understanding the depth of the problem within the Force and the TSB, and the implications to law enforcement in general that has been created by senior management with this precedence. After confirming their beliefs with their own CBC lawyers, they agreed that in any investigation, the results of that investigation cannot and must not be controlled by the commissioner's office or any delegate, or by the head of the TSB, and that the rule of law demands that the evidence trail must be followed. If a commissioned officer or his delegate has the right to control the evidence trail and what an investigator puts in his/her notes, then why investigate or make notes at all. Eventually we might even be able to eliminate the court process and send the suspect directly to jail. They do that elsewhere in the world, so why not here? We could even adopt the acronym description of the TSB – The Speculation Bunch. 'Why investigate when you can speculate' was a favourite saying around the hangar floor, even by some TSB members themselves.
Within four days of the airing of the Fifth Estate program, I was contacted by the NCO i/c RCMP Intellectual Property Office about the use of RCMP images and crest on my personal website. It had been functional for more than eight years. It rather seems that 'HQ' Ottawa is more concerned over copyright infringements on behalf of the US based Disney Company than they are of their own legal and moral obligations to the Canadian public.
Having worked with a large number of members across this great country throughout my thirty-two years of service, I have no doubt that the decisions of my former supervisors and of the 'Ethics Advisor' for this investigation are in total conflict with the past actions and beliefs of those who are or were steadfast members. Members of the RCMP swear to uphold the rule of law without fear or favor and have done so for nearly as long as this country is old. I was simply one of any number of past or present members who has maintained the right, being duty and honour bound to do so. It is my hope now that all the thousands of vets who are of a like mind will step forward to demand that this disease that has pervaded the senior ranks during recent years will be swept away. When we joined, becoming a member of the Force was not a job, it was an honourable profession. It was not temporary; it was for a lifetime because it shaped our lives. We lived and breathed what the Force stood for because we were the Force. We and the friends no longer with us today made the reputation of the Force what it was then, and what it still should be today. This group of law breakers, along with a few others, has done much to damage that reputation, and it is time for a change. Like the drill instructors always said, 'Stand straight and tall'. It is time to speak up and let the Prime Minister know!

(Thomas C. Juby), #28306 Retired RCMP      fpecjuby@eastlink.ca